This paper examines the role of judgment shocks in combination with other structural shocks in explaining post-war economic volatility within the context of a New Keynesian model. Agents form expectations using constant gain learning then augment these forecasts with judgment. These judgments may be interpreted as a reaction to current news stories or policy announcements that would inuence people's expectations. I allow for the possibility that these judgments be informatively based on information about structural shocks, but judgment itself may also be subject to its own stochastic shocks. I estimate a standard New Keynesian model that includes these shocks using Bayesian simulation methods. To aid in identifying expectational shocks from other structural shocks I include data on professional forecasts along with data on output gap, ination, and interest rates. I nd judgment is largely not informed by macroeconomic fundamentals; most of the variability in judgment is explained by its own stochastic shocks. Impulse response functions from the estimated model illustrate how shocks to judgment destabilize the economy and explain business cycle uctuations.
Introduction
Rational expectations with full information about quantities of relevant state variables and stochastic shocks is the most common assumption among research using models of the macroeconomy. The assumption makes solving, evaluating, and estimating macroeconomic models possible with standard tools (albeit, still rather sophisticated), but the informational requirements and information processing requirements behind the assumption are rather extreme. Least squares learning is a type of non-rational, adaptive expectations that attempts to use more realistic forecasting methods within the context of macroeconomic models to understand macroeconomic dynamics. In such a framework, economic agents gather past data and use simple least squares time series techniques to form their expectations for future outcomes before making forward looking decisions (a feasible and rather simple statistical exercise).
One drawback of least squares learning is that expectations are based only on collections of past data that are passed through some statistical procedure. Forward looking decisions might also be well guided by relevant current events that have not yet made themselves evident in historical data. Examples of such events include the passing of a new law, a natural disaster, a change in political landscape, a change in international trade patterns, or news of a recent technological development, just to name a few. As soon as such events are made known through the media, optimizing economic agents would do well to immediately change their expectations and decisions accordingly. One could argue that rational expectations captures this realistic component of expectations formation that learning does not. Typically in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with rational expectations, the values for current stochastic shocks are known before expectations are made. We can interpret the quantities for these stochastic shocks as precisely measured impacts the above events on the macroeconomy.
It might also happen that current events are misinterpreted, the quantied impact is misjudged, or that judgment is otherwise misinformed and not based on actual events. One example of an exaggerated news story in recent U.S. history might be the Y2K computer bug widely discussed in the late 1990s. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks may be an example of a very real event, but whose implications to economic activity may have been overestimated. Rational expectations cannot account for such misinterpretations of news of this type.
Judgment based on information in the news that is impractical or impossible to quantify may therefore benet optimal decision making, be detrimental, or more probably a combination of both. I examine within the context of a standard stochastic New Keynesian model expectations that are formed by least squares learning forecasts and are then augmented by judgment. The least squares forecasts incorporates historical data on the output gap, ination rate, and the federal funds rate, data that can be readily obtained and which are informative for expectations within the context of the New Keynesian model. If expectations were rational and agents had full information, they would also use current realizations of structural shocks in forming expectations. In the learning environment with judgment, values for structural shocks cannot be obtained or estimated, but judgments based on news and current events may incorporate some of this information. Judgment may also be subject to its own stochastic shocks that are independent to all other shocks and state variables. This stochastic component of judgment can be viewed as the detrimental component to using judgment; shocks that are unrelated to economic fundamentals aect agents expectations and forward looking decisions. One of the contributions of this paper is to provide an estimate for the degree to which judgment has inuenced expectations in the post-war U.S. monetary economy, and how much of this judgment is informative (that is, related to current realizations of structural shocks) and how much is disruptive (independent of structural shocks). I further illustrate the inuence judgment shocks have had on the dynamics of ination, output, and interest rates in U.S. history, along with traditional supply, demand, and monetary policy shocks.
Before moving forward, it is prudent to dene the following terms used in this paper that I give precise meanings to, perhaps using these somewhat dierently than other papers in the literature: Expectation: the value agents actually expect a variable to take in the future. This will be the sum of agents' econometric forecast and their judgment. When taking the model to the data, expectations are matched to median responses from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
Econometric forecast: a forecast for a future variable computed using least squares methods and past data on the output gap, ination rate, and the federal funds rate.
Judgment: sometimes referred to as add-factors in the literature. A value that is added to agents' econometric forecasts to reect their actual expectations of what is to come.
Judgment is a linear combination of structural shocks and judgment shocks.
Structural shocks or fundamental shocks: traditional stochastic shocks in the New Keynesian model: a natural rate shock, a cost shock, and a monetary policy shock. Current values of structural shocks aect macroeconomic dynamics but they have no inuence on agents' econometric forecasts. They may, however, inuence judgment.
Judgment shocks: stochastic shocks to judgment that are independent of the structural shocks.
Related Literature
The literature on learning specic to monetary economics can be broadly put into two categories: 1) theoretical work that examines stability of equilibria under learning versus rational expectations, and 2) empirical and descriptive research that examines the dierence in macroeconomic dynamics between learning and rational expectations. The rst branch explores the conditions for expectational stability, or E-stability, on monetary policy parameters. A model with learning that is E-stable will have expectations that converge to the rational expectations equilibrium, within the neighborhood of the rational expectations solution. Examples papers of this type are numerous, but include Bullard and Mitra (2002) and (2007), Honkapohja (2003a) and (2003b) , and Preston (2005) , just to name a few. These papers demonstrate that conditions on monetary policy for E-stability can be dierent and more restrictive than conditions for determinacy (the relevant condition when expectations are rational); the implication is that the economy can become unstable and volatile if monetary policy strays from these restrictions.
Such concerns have motivated the second branch of literature which investigates whether learning can explain macroeconomic dynamics we see in the data that is not well explained by traditional rational expectations models. Orphanides and Williams (2005b) use a calibrated model with learning to demonstrate that transient ination shocks can lead to ination scares, prolonged periods of high ination. Findings like these suggests that learning can explain macroeconomic persistence. Milani (2007) nds evidence for this with an estimated New Keynesian model with learning. He nds learning can explain persistence in ination and output without the need for common mechanical sources of persistence, such as habit formation and ination indexation which are typically augmented to rational expectations models. Learning has also been used to explain characteristics of the Great Ination and Great Moderation, the large run-up of ination and macroeconomic volatility in the 1970s followed by a long period of relatively moderate volatility and low ination since 1984.
Examples of such papers include Orphanides and Williams (2005a) , Primiceri (2006) , Bullard and Eusepi (2005) , and Bullard and Singh (2007) .
Preceding this paper, relatively little work has investigated the importance of judgment on expectations. Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox (1997) and Svensson (2005) demonstrate the usefulness of judgment for central bankers when making monetary policy decisions. Bullard, Evans, and Honkapohja (2008) and (2010) incorporate judgment of the kind that is purely disruptive (judgments depend exclusively on stochastic shocks that are independent of economic fundamentals) into simple monetary models and demonstrate that judgment can create exuberance equilibria, a condition that is susceptible to self-fullling judgments even when an equilibrium is otherwise locally determinant and/or E-stable. They go on to suggest appropriate monetary policy to prevent such unstable outcomes.
These papers by Bullard, Evans, and Honkapohja fall into the rst branch of learning literature mentioned above: they provide theoretical evidence that expectations formed by judgment and learning can lead to economic instability. The present work is the rst attempt to bring the issue to the second branch: to determine whether judgment with learning can explain characteristics of business cycle uctuations seen in data for the post-war United States.
Model
Learning and judgment are examined within the context of a standard New Keynesian model, a model that has been estimated at great length with rational expectations and learning to investigate the roles stochastic shocks play in explaining macroeconomic dynamics. The model consists of three sectors that describe consumer behavior, producer behavior under imperfectly exible prices, and monetary policy. Optimal consumer behavior is described by with a set of equations that determine current consumption based on past consumption, interest rates, and expectations of future consumption and future ination.
Producer behavior is modeled with a Phillips curve which predicts the ination rate that arises from rm's optimal pricing strategies when subject to a pricing friction. The nal sector is monetary policy, which I assume to follow a standard Taylor rule where the central bank sets a nominal interest rate which responds to expectations of future output and ination. These equations jointly determine the dynamics of the output gap (the percentage dierence between real GDP and potential GDP), the ination rate, and the nominal interest rate.
1 Notable examples using rational expectations include Ireland (2004a) and (2004b) , Nason and Smith (2005) , and Smets and Wouters (2003 , just to name a few. Examples of estimated DSGE models with learning include Milani (2007) , Slobodyan and 2 This is perhaps the most common way to incorporate learning into dynamic macroeconomic models.
However, as Marcet and Sargent (1989) Each consumer of type i ∈ (0, 1) chooses consumption, c t , labor supply, n t (i), and purchases of real government bonds, b t (i), to maximize lifetime utility,
subject to the budget constraint,
where ξ t is an aggregate preference shock, w t (i)/p t is the real wage paid to type i labor; Π t is the total value of prots consumers earn by owning stock in rms, and τ t is the real value of lump sum taxes. The preference parameters are the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, denoted by σ ∈ (0, ∞); the elasticity of labor supply, denoted by µ ∈ (0, ∞); and the degree of habit formation, denoted by η ∈ [0, 1). When the degree of habit formation is greater than zero, consumers' utility from current consumption depends on their previous level of consumption. Habit formation introduces persistence in consumption, and therefore output, which is commonly found in empirical studies of DSGE models.
3
Log-linearizing consumers' rst order conditions leads to the following log-linear Euler
whereλ t is the percentage deviation from the steady state of the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, (2), and is therefore interpreted as the marginal utility of real income. A hat indicates the percentage deviation of a variable from its steady state.
4 Utility maximization leads to the following log-linear marginal utility of income,
The marginal utility of income, (4), and the Euler equation, (3), make up the IS sector of the model.
Producers
There is one nal good used for consumption which is sold in a perfectly competitive market and produced with a continuum of intermediate goods according to the production function,
where y t is the output of the nal good, y t (i) is the output of intermediate good i, and θ ∈ (1, ∞) is the elasticity of substitution in production. Prot maximization leads to the 3 For example, Smets and Wouters (2005) nd point estimates of habit formation close to unity. Furthermore, Fuhrer (2000) nds that habit formation leads to hump-shaped impulse response functions, a characteristic commonly supported by U.S. and European data. Milani (2007) nds a signicant degree of habit formation, but only under rational expectations. When estimating the model with constant gain learning, he nds an estimate for the degree of habit formation close to zero. 4 A hat is omitted from π t because it is necessary to assume the steady state level of ination is equal to zero when deriving the log-linear supply relationship.
following demand for each intermediate good,
where p t (i) is the price of intermediate good i and p t is the price of the nal good. Substituting equation (6) into equation (5) leads to the following expression for the price of the nal good in terms of the prices of intermediate goods,
Each intermediate good is sold in a monopolistically competitive market and is produced according to the production function, y t (i) = z t n t (i), where z t is an aggregate technology shock. It can be shown that intermediate goods rms' optimal choices for labor demand and labor market clearing leads to the following aggregate log-linear marginal cost,
Firm's pricing conditions are subject to the Calvo (1983) pricing friction, where only a constant fraction of rms are able to re-optimize their price in a given period. The rms that are able to re-optimize their price is randomly determined, completely independently of rms' prices or any other characteristics or history. I suppose that rms who are not able to re-optimize their price do adjust their price by a fraction, γ ∈ [0, 1), of the previous period's ination rate. A positive degree of price indexation introduces a source of persistence in ination which is often found to be statistically signicant when estimating New Keynesian models (see for example, Smets and Wouters (2003) , (2005), (2007), and Milani (2007) ).
Let ω ∈ (0, 1) denote the fraction of rms that are not able to re-optimize their prices every period. Since these rms are randomly determined, ω
T is the probability that a rm will not be able to re-optimize its price for T consecutive periods. A rm who is able to re-optimize chooses its price to maximize the following present discounted utility value of prots earned while the rm is unable to re-optimize its price again:
where Ψ [y t+T (i)] is the real total cost function of producing y t+T (i) units, given the optimal decision for labor, and π * t+T ≡ T j=1 (1 + γπ t+j−1 ) is degree to which the rm's price is able to adjust according to ination indexation. It can be shown that the rst order condition for p t (i) combined with the nal good price index, equation (7), leads to the log-linear Phillips equation,
Fully Flexible Prices
The IS equations and Phillips equation can be re-written in terms of the dierence from the outcome under fully exible prices. This allows the model to be taken to data on the output gap, the percentage deviation of real GDP from real potential GDP, as measured by the Congressional Budget Oce.
Letỹ t =ŷ t −ŷ and marginal utility of income, (4), still hold. Using these conditions and imposing goods market clearing that consumption is equal to output implies,
where r n t is the percentage deviation of the natural interest rate from its steady state. The natural interest rate is the interest rate that would occur under fully exible prices. I 5 It is assumed during the log-linearization that there is a steady state for the price level, which implicitly assumes the steady state level of ination is equal to zero.
suppose that r n t follows the stochastic exogenous process,
where n,t is an independently and identically distributed shock.
When prices are fully exible, it can be shown that intermediate goods rms will all choose the same price in a given period, and the marginal cost of production is constant, and therefore always will be equal to its steady state value. Under fully exible prices,
One can solve this equation forẑ t and substitute it back into the equation for marginal cost, (8). Plugging this expression for marginal cost into equation (10) yields the following Phillips curve in terms of the output gap,
While this expression for the Phillips curve is not subject to a structural shock, when estimating the model it is convenient to have a shock here to avoid the problem of stochastic singularity. The Phillips curve is amended with a cost shock so the form to be estimated is given by,
where κ is the reduced form coecient on the marginal cost and u t is the exogenous cost shock that evolves according to,
where u,t is an independently and identically distributed shock.
Monetary Policy
The nominal interest rate is determined jointly with output and ination by monetary policy.
In this paper I assume the monetary authority follows a Taylor (1993) type rule where the interest rate is set in response to expected output and expected ination, with a preference for interest rate smoothing, according to,
where ρ r ∈ [0, 1) is the degree of exogenous interest rate persistence, ψ π ∈ (0, ∞) is the degree to which monetary policy responds to expectations of future ination, ψ y ∈ (0, ∞)
is the degree to which monetary policy responds to the expected output gap, and r,t is an independently and identically distributed exogenous monetary policy shock with mean zero and variance given by σ 
Complete Model
The complete linear New Keynesian model is represented by the IS relationship, given in equations (11) and (12); the Phillips curve in equation (14), and the Taylor rule in equation (16). These equations determine the dynamics of the output gap (ỹ t ), the marginal utility of income gap (λ t ), the ination rate (π t ), and the interest rate (r t ). The model so far is subject to three structural shocks: the natural rate shock, the cost push shock, and the monetary policy shock.
Expectations

Learning
The log-linearized model in the previous section can be expressed in the general form:
where the notation x e t+1 has replaced E t x t+1 to denote possibly non-rational expectations; x t is a vector of minimum state variables, given by x t = [ỹ t π trt ] , and z t is a vector of structural shocks, given by z t = [r n t u t r,t ] . The variableλ t can be eliminated by substituting equation (12) into equations (11) and (14), which leads to the inclusion of the two-period ahead expectation for the output gap, E tỹt+2 , in the IS equation. The minimum state variable (MSV) solution under rational expectations is given by,
where the elements of the matrices G and H are a function of the parameters of the model and may be determined by the method of undetermined coecients. Agents that learn do not know the the parameters that govern the economy, but do use this reduced form as their forecasting model. Agents' information sets are restricted only to past data on x t , so they are unable to collect data on past structural shocks to estimate matrix H.
In period t agents are able to assemble data sets only through period t − 1. At this point the agents estimate G using least squares and use the model to make econometric forecasts for future output and ination. There is no constant term in the general form of the model, equation (17), or in the rational expectation, given in equation (19) 
where x * t = [1 x t ] is the vector of explanatory variables including the constant. This equation can be conveniently rewritten in the following recursive form:
where g t = 1/(t − 1) is the learning gain.
6 The recursive form shows precisely how expectations are adaptive. The term enclosed in parentheses in equation (21) is the realized forecast error using the previous estimateĜ * t−1 . The degree to which agents adjust their expectations depends on the size of this forecast error, the variance of the estimated coecients, captured by the inverse of matrix R t , and the size of the learning gain, g t . The larger is the learning gain, the more expectations respond to the latest forecast error. When agents use OLS, g t approaches zero as time approaches innity. Under constant gain learning, g t remains at some constant level, g, so the degree to which new observations can aect expectations is always the same.
Agents use the least squares estimate of the coecients in G to form the econometric 6 To show this, let R t =
forecasts,
where E * t denotes expectation that is equal to the econometric forecast.
Judgment
Agents are not able to collect realizations of stochastic shocks, z t , in their forecasts.
7 However, current events may reveal some noisy information about structural shocks, which becomes part of judgment when forming expectations. Examples of such events may be the announcement of technological innovations, natural disasters, onset of war or political instability among trading partners, changes in weather eecting agricultural production, etc.
The news of such events cannot be instantly mapped to data to make econometric forecasts, but it is nonetheless valuable information when forming expectations. Let agents' nal expectations be the following sum of the econometric forecast given in equation (23) and judgment,
where η t is an appropriately sized vector whose non-zero elements are values for judgment concerning the future output gap (η y,t ) and future ination rate (η π,t ). The judgment vector depends on current events that includes some information about z t , but it also includes expectational shocks, its own stochastic component that is independent of economic funda-7 Central banks do use a number of such sophisticated models that incorporate the presence of latent structural shocks when forming forecasts. Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox (1997) and Svensson (2005) point out that judgment is nonetheless an important component of central bank expectations and decisions.
mentals. Let judgment evolve according to,
where matrix Φ captures the degree to which judgment successfully picks up information about structural shocks and ζ t is a vector of autocorrelated disturbances to the judgment variables. The second and third equations allow these disturbances to be autocorrelated so that agents' ill-informed judgment about a particular variable may persist for multiple quarters depending on the parameters ρ ζ,y and ρ ζ,y . The judgment shocks ξ y,t and ξ π,t are independently and normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation given by σ ξ,y and σ ξ,π , respectively.
The structural form for evolution of judgment in equation (25) is quite general and allows as special cases common specications for expectations in DSGE models. If ρ zeta,y = ρ ζ,y = 0 and V ar(ξ y,t ) = V ar(ξ π,t ) = 0 then expectations are not subject to judgment shocks. If Φ = 0, then stochastic shocks are always unobservable when forming expectations, which is a common assumption among empirical learning papers. If Φ = HA, where H is the coecient on expected shocks in the MSV solution in equation (19) and A is the degree of persistence of structural shocks given in (18), then agents are capable of observing quantities for structural shocks and the inuence these shocks have on expectations is equal to the rational expectations solution. In fact, the entire model encompasses rational expectations as a special case when these conditions are met, the learning gain is equal to zero (g = 0), and the initial condition for learning coecients, G * t in equation (21), is consistent with the MSV solution, G in equation (19) . This initial condition is estimated using pre-sample data as described in the next section, and all other parameters mentioned here are estimated jointly with the New Keynesian structural parameters, so this framework can be viewed as quite unrestricted.
Estimation
The model is estimated using U.S. quarterly data from 
State Space Representation
Equations (17), (18), (21), (22), (23), and (25) 
where s t = [ỹ t π trtỹ e t+1ỹ e t+2 π e t+1 η y,t η π,t r n t u t ζ y,t ζ π,t ] is a vector of state variables, and v t = [ n,t u,t r,t ξ y,t ξ π,t ] is a vector of all the independently and identically distributed 8 Habit formation causes the two period ahead expectation,ỹ e t+2 to appear in the model, which in turn requires an evaluating a time t expectation for judgment η y,t+1 . For simplicity, I suppose this judgment is formed using the mathematical expectation operator on the equations in (25), advanced to period t + 1. This implies that when using judgment for expectations two periods ahead, agents already discount this judgment depending on the degree of persistence, ρ ζ,y ; and the degree to which stochastic shocks z t impact judgment two periods ahead is determined by the actual degree of persistence dictated persistence of the natural rate and cost-push shocks (given by parameters ρ n and ρ u ). stochastic shocks. The time-varying component of vector f t and matrix F t comes from the coecients inĝ t andĜ t determined by the learning process in (23). Since f t and F t depend only on lagged realizations of some of the state variables, they can be treated as predetermined when evaluating the Kalman lter.
Let GAP t denote the data on the output gap, IN F t denote data on ination, F F t denote data on the Federal Funds Rate, and SP F _GAP t and SP F _I N F t denote data on expected one-quarter ahead output gap and ination rate, respectively, implied by the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The observation equations are given by,
The state variables are multiplied by 100 to convert decimals to percentages, and the ination rate, expected ination rate, and federal funds rate are multiplied by 4 to convert quarterly rates to annualized rates. The New Keynesian model assumes that the steady state ination rate is equal to zero, but since this is not likely the case in the data, the annualized steady state ination rate, given by π * , is included in the observation equations above. The steady state gross real interest rate is set equal to the inverse of the discount factor; therefore r * = 400(1 − 1/β). These steady state parameters are calibrated to π * = 3.4 and β = 0.9956 so the steady state values match the average ination rate and nominal interest rate in the sample.
Initial Conditions
Aside from standard initial conditions for the Kalman lter, it is necessary to specify initial conditions forĜ * 0 and R 0 , the initial values for learning process given in equations (21) and (22). I use pre-sample data from 1954:Q2 through 1968:Q2 on the output gap, ination rate, and federal funds rate and and transform these into the same terms as the state vector, x t , according to,ỹ t = 1 100 GAP t ,
I estimate a VAR(1) (the same reduced form as used in the least squared learning process described in Section 4) on this data using ordinary least squares to set initial values for the learning matrices. The coecients from the regression are used to initializeĜ * 0 , and the elements from the sum of squares component of the estimate of the variance of the coecients is used to initialize R 0 . Table 1 lists the parameters to be estimated, along with the prior distribution imposed for Bayesian estimation. The parameters include the learning gain, the parameters of the New Keynesian Model described in Section 3, the coecients Φ in equation (25) governing how stochastic shocks informatively impact judgment, the persistence of stochastic components to judgment, also in equation (25), and the standard deviation of the structural shocks and judgment shocks.
Bayesian Estimation
The model is estimated with Bayesian methods using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
The vector of parameters were drawn from the posterior distribution 400,000 times and the rst 100,000 draws were discarded for a burn-in period. Table 1 shows the prior distributions used for the estimation. The prior distributions for the New Keynesian parameters are similar to others used in the literature. The prior mean for the learning gain is set to 0.02, with a rather large standard deviation of 0.03 which allows for a wide range for learning dynamics.
The value of the learning gain two standard deviations above the mean is 0.08, which means agents econometric estimates evolve very quickly and the approximate sample size agents to develop their econometric estimates is only 0.08 −1 = 12.5 (just over 3 years of data). The large standard deviation for the prior on the learning gain also allows for a relatively large probability that the learning gain is close to zero, implying agents use a very large number of observations and agents adjust their econometric estimates only very slowly. Finally, the prior distributions for the coecients in judgment process are intentionally made very wide in recognition that no previous literature has attempted to measure or even discuss such coecients. The priors for these coecients are normal with zero mean and standard deviation equal to 4.0.
Results
Parameters
The prior and posterior distributions for the parameters are listed in Table 2 . The last three columns present the median, 5th percentile and 95th percentile of the posterior distributions for the parameters. The estimate for the learning gain is found to be 0.0322 with a relatively tight posterior distribution relative to the prior. This implies that agents use approximately 0.0322 −1 = 31.06 observations for forming least squares forecasts, which corresponds to about 7.75 years. This is a magnitude similar to that found by Milani (2007) , and Slobodyan and . Habit formation is found to be a signicant source of persistence, with an estimate η = 0.6871. Price indexation is found to be less important in explaining persistence with an estimate γ = 0.2462. Other signicant sources of persistence come from the natural rate shock (ρ n = 0.95), cost shock (ρ u = 0.78), and the persistence of disturbances to judgment on output and ination, with ρ ζ,y = 0.94 and ρ ζ,π = 0.89, respectively. Only the preference parameters σ and µ are poorly identied by the data; these posterior distributions largely mirror the priors.
Judgment
The posterior distributions for the coecients in Φ for the judgment process are very signicantly informed by the data; these posterior distributions are considerably tight given the very wide prior distributions. Recall the parameters in Φ determine how much judgment depends on actual stochastic shocks. Using equation (25), the variance of judgment can be decomposed into variance caused by structural parameters (informed judgment) and variance from the independent stochastic component (judgment shocks) as follows,
Both z t and ζ t are autoregressive stochastic processes whose variances depend on the variances for the shocks. To illustrate, the variance for z t can be derived from the variance of the underlying independently and identically distributed shocks using equation (18) as follows,
Since the variance of z t does not depend on time, we can solve for this variance using the vec() operator on both sides of this equation,
Solving leads to the expression,
The o-diagonal elements of V ar( t ) are zero, and the diagonal elements are given by squares of σ n , σ u , and σ r , whose estimates are reported in Table 2 . The output vec(V ar(z t )) is then appropriately re-sized to yield V ar(z t ) to substitute into equation (28). A symmetric exercise performed on the autoregressive equations in (25) yields V ar(ζ t ).
Given the estimates for these variances, equation (??) can be used to determine what percentage of the variability in judgment depends on structural shocks and judgment shocks. Table 3 reports these results. About 85% of the variability judgment in output is explained by the variance of the shock to judgment and the remaining 15% of variability is explained primarily by the variance of the natural rate shock. This implies judgment on output is primarily ill-informed: only a small amount of judgment is based on information related to fundamentals in the economy. The second column of Table 3 shows the result is very similar for judgment regarding ination. About 62% of the judgment in ination is ill-informed, and the remaining 38% depends on information from the cost shock. The impact of monetary policy shocks on judgment of both variables was essentially equal to zero.
Its interesting that both the natural rate shock and cost shock help inform judgment, but strangely, the natural rate shock is not used for judgments regarding ination, and the cost shock is not used for judgments regarding output. Both of these shocks inuence output and ination in equilibrium -yet agents mistakenly believe that cost shocks only drive ination, and natural rate shocks only drive output.
Impulse Responses
Impulse response functions cannot be computed in quite the same way in models with learning as models with rational expectations. Learning adds a non-linearity to the model: the coecients on the state equation, (26), have a time t subscript which depend on the state of the state of the learning process, represented by matricesĜ * t and R t in equations (21) and (22), respectively. The responses to structural shocks depend on the state of the learning process and are therefore time-dependent. Moreover, unlike a rational expectations model, a model with learning evolves absent of any shocks when learning matricesĜ * t and R t are away from the rational expectations solution. Expectations continue to evolve with new incoming data, causing movements in output, ination, and interest rates even when all shocks are set equal to zero.
9 To identify the impact a shock has in this ever-changing environment, I
simulate the model using the state equation (26) with all shocks for all time periods set to zero. I then simulate the model with a one standard deviation impulse shock. In the rst period only one shock is set equal to its standard deviation and all other shocks are set to zero for all other time periods. The dierence between these two simulations is the impulse response function. Figure 1 shows the responses to the output gap and ination rate from a one standard deviation shock to output judgment (ξ y,t ) and ination judgment (ξ π,t ). The impulse responses
show the output gap and ination increase in response to a shock in output judgment. A positive shock to output judgment means that agents believe there will be higher output in the future. This judgment is somewhat self fullling as agents increase their current demand for consumption, causing the increase in the output gap and also ination.
Close inspection of the three-dimensional impulse responses reveal there are periods in which the responses to the judgment shocks are relatively more severe. To compare the relative importance of the judgment shocks and structural shocks, Table   4 reports the sample period average of the root mean squared responses illustrated in Figures   1 and 3 . The output judgment shock has the largest impulse response on the output gap.
A one standard deviation shock to output judgment has an average (root mean squared) impact on the output gap equal to 1.3% over the rst four quarters following the shock, and 1.06% over the rst sixteen quarters. The next biggest shocks aecting the output gap are the monetary policy shock and the natural rate shock. The ination judgment shock also has important impacts on ination four-quarter and sixteen-quarter impulse responses and are in similar magnitude as the other shocks.
Conclusion
Rational expectations is a prominent assumption used in evaluating economic issues analyzed with DSGE models, but in reality people consider statistical forecasts then use judgment when forming their actual expectations. I estimate a standard New Keynesian model using data on the output gap, ination rate, and interest rates along with data on expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Fundamental structural shocks in the model include the natural rate shock, cost shock, and monetary policy shock. I allow judgment to be based on these shocks, indicating judgment can be informed by current fundamental shocks, but it can also be subject to its own stochastic disturbances that are orthogonal to current structural shocks and past state variables. Stochastic shocks to judgment is found to be a signicant source of economic persistence and economic volatility in U.S.
history. Furthermore, judgment is found to be determined primarily by its own stochastic disturbances; very little of the variability in judgment is shown to depend on fundamental shocks. 
